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Interpretation 
Martin Hogg
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D. THE WAY FORWARD FOR LAW REFORM 
 
 
A. INTRODUCTION 
 
In every legal system there exist a number of perennially troubling aspects of contract law, 
among them the questions of whether a contract has in fact been formed, alleged errors in 
contracting, the extent of recoverable damages, and the proper interpretation (or 
“construction”)1 of the contract’s terms. The last of these is the subject of a recent Scottish 
                                                 
*
 Senior Lecturer in Law, University of Edinburgh. 
1
 McBryde argues (W W McBryde, The Law of Contract in Scotland, 3
rd
 edn (2007) para 8-05) that 
interpretation and construction are two distinct tasks, but this may have been seen by the Law Commission 
either as an overly fussy distinction or else as a distinction without a difference, as no reference is made in the 
Discussion Paper to any apparent difference between the two concepts. For academic discussion of Scottish 
legal perspectives on interpretation of contract, see L Macgregor and C Lewis, “Interpretation of contract”, in R 
Zimmermann, D Visser and K Reid (eds), Mixed Legal Systems in Comparative Perspective: Property and 
Obligations in Comparative Perspective (2004) 66, and D Cabrelli, “Interpretation of contracts, objectivity and 
the elision of consent reached through consent and compromise” 2011 JR, forthcoming. 
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Law Commission Discussion Paper,2 this paper forming part of the Commission’s ongoing 
review of contract law announced in its Eighth Programme of Law Reform.3 
If one were to attempt to suggest anything linking these perennially troubling aspects 
of contract law, one strong candidate would present itself, that being the question of whether, 
at root, contracts are constituted by the subjective agreement of the parties or by the objective 
impression which the conduct of such parties presents. The tension between these two 
perspectives on contracts, the subjective and objective, lies at the very heart of the divergent 
will and reliance families of contract theory. A tendency to prefer one perspective over the 
other has had a profound impact upon the judicial assessment of whether parties have yet 
reached the point of a binding agreement at law, upon policies relating to error, upon the 
extent of damages recoverable on breach, and – the subject of the matter at hand – upon the 
approach of courts to the interpretation of contract terms.  
 
 
B. SUBJECTIVE OR OBJECTIVE UNDERSTANDINGS OF THE NATURE OF 
CONTRACT 
 
Historically, Scots contract law has been said to rest upon the agreement of the parties, an 
exercise which supposes the ascertainment of whether, subjectively, they have reached 
consensus in idem. In keeping with this, our law has preferred a will theory of contract, 
rejecting competing ideas that contractual liability is generally based upon reliance (even if 
reliance-based liability has grounded remedies for misrepresentation, undue influence, and 
the like).4 Yet, at least since the nineteenth century (but arguably even earlier, since Stair first 
stressed the necessity for “engagement” before obligations could be constituted),5 it has been 
recognised that, for all practicable purposes, it is the objective manifestation of the will of the 
parties upon which courts rely in determining contractual formation and content: not “what 
did they do?” but “what did they reasonably appear to do?”. Lord President Dunedin’s 
famous words in Muirhead & Turnbull v Dickson6 are often cited to illustrate this, but there 
are numerous other dicta demonstrating this view. There remains a tension in the law as to 
whether the proper objective perspective ought to be entirely detached objectivity or rather 
                                                 
2
 Scottish Law Commission, Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (Scot Law Com No 147, 2011).  
3
 Scottish Law Commission, Eighth Programme of Law Reform (Scot Law Com No 220, 2010). 
4
 On the place of the will and reliance theories in Scots law, see M Hogg, “Perspectives on contract theory from 
a mixed legal system” (2009) 29 OJLS 643.  
5
 Stair, Inst 1.10.2. 
6
 (1905) 7 F 686.  
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the objectivity of a reasonable person in the shoes of the contracting parties (what might be 
called “subjective objectivity”), and there are competing views of courts sometimes stressing 
one over the other, but the pendulum has undoubtedly swung, in general terms, away from 
the subjective to one or other manifestation of the objective. 
How does the issue of objectivity versus subjectivity play out in the field of 
contractual interpretation? In a number of different ways. At heart, there is the fundamental 
question of whether contracting parties, in choosing to embody their contract in a particular 
language and in using particular words from that language, submit themselves to the idea that 
language has an objective meaning. The idea that it does is the very basis of dictionaries. Dr 
Johnson would not have got very far in his enterprise if there had been no generally agreed 
meanings to words.7 We do, of course, recognise generally agreed meanings for words, and, 
when we speak, we make use of such meanings, albeit that the same word can have a number 
of different meanings depending upon the context in which we use it, and that, while some 
meanings for words are dropping out of use, others are constantly arising. The law, through 
the faculty of our wills, allows us to bind ourselves to obligations. To paraphrase Aquinas,8 
we make, as it were, a law to ourselves when we contract. What we are taken to mean in the 
contracts we conclude is thus immensely important.  
On one view of our faculty to bind ourselves contractually, we may even be entitled 
to create our own personal language or dictionary, one constructed without regard to the 
meaning which the language we use ordinarily ascribes to the words used by us in the context 
in question. That, at least, is the conclusion reached from a strong emphasis upon the 
subjective will of the parties: if what is crucial, in assessing contracts, is discovering what 
parties really intended, then we should use all available evidence to uncover the meaning 
which those parties gave to the words and phrases they used. Such an approach gives rise to a 
very private view of contract: a contract is essentially a personal matter of the parties – if 
outsiders would be puzzled at what the parties meant when saying what they did, that is of no 
importance.  
There is a different view of contracts, however. If parties choose to frame their 
agreement in a specific language, then it can be said that they submit to the fundamental 
purpose of language: communication through the use of a shared linguistic medium. Such a 
shared medium depends upon words having an objectively agreed meaning, albeit one which 
                                                 
7
 Notwithstanding the comment of Humpty Dumpty in Lewis Carroll’s Through the Looking Glass that “When I 
use a word … it means just what I choose it to mean – neither more nor less”. 
8
 See Aquinas, Summa Theologica, II-II, Q 88, art 10. 
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may be finely attuned to the specific context in which the words are used (that context being 
not merely one of sentence structure, but, especially in a legal context, one relating to the 
legal end which an agreement is designed to serve). Such a view overcomes the difficulty that 
each of the parties may have had a different understanding of the words being used (a 
problem which evidently cannot be solved on a subjective, agreement approach), as it holds 
that the parties must be taken to have intended the objective meaning of the words used in the 
relevant context. It also recognises that contracts have not just a private life, but also a public 
one: contracts may confer rights upon third parties, either under a jus quaesitum tertio or 
through assignation; contracts may be subjected to taxes dependent upon their content (as, for 
instance, in the case of stamp duty); contracts may be registered in public registers, and may 
require to be enforced by public officials, including the keepers of registers, arbiters, and 
courts. Very few contracts are entirely private affairs. An approach to the construction of 
contracts which emphasises the objective meaning of words seems most suited to the 
recognition of these public aspects of contracts. 
The discussion up to this point may have seemed overly theoretical, but its 
significance lies in the fact that the theory adopted will heavily influence the detail of the 
rules chosen in any system for the construction of contracts. It is not surprising then to see 
that the theoretical questions discussed above have heavily influenced the debates about 
interpretation of contracts which have featured in the significant judicial decisions of the last 
fifteen years or so, as well as the content of the new Discussion Paper produced by the Law 
Commission. The theory preferred – whether it tends towards subjectivity or objectivity – 
influences a number of interpretative issues, among them the following: (1) a legal system’s 
fundamental or basic rule of interpretation, (2) the question of the breadth of the context or 
conduct which can be referred to in the interpretative exercise, (3) whether consideration of 
anything beyond the words of the contract alone is only permissible in cases of “ambiguity”; 
(4) the position of third parties; (5) the use of maxims or rules of interpretation; and (6) the 
permissibility and function of so-called “entire contract clauses”. The Discussion Paper 
considered all of these issues (making some suggestions for law reform on some of them) and 
sought the views of interested parties on them. 
 
 
C. THE FUNDAMENTAL ISSUES RAISED IN THE DISCUSSION PAPER 
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The Commission was not beginning from a tabula rasa. In 1997 it issued a Report on 
Interpretation in Private Law (henceforth “RIPL”),9 but the recommendations contained in 
the report were never implemented. The matter of interpretation was thus, for the 
Commission, very much one of unfinished business. In addition to this previous Report, there 
has since 1997 been something of a revolution (led by Lord Hoffmann) in judicial thought on 
interpretation, though the radical manifesto of this revolution has not met with universal 
approval on the Scottish and English benches. New model law, principally the Principles of 
European Contract Law (PECL) and the Draft Common Frame of Reference (DCFR), has 
also addressed the question of contractual interpretation. There was thus much for the 
Commission to ponder in this new Discussion Paper. Its contribution can usefully be 
considered by reference to the seven interpretative issues listed above: 
 
(1) The legal system’s fundamental or basic rule of interpretation 
It is common for legal systems to have a basic rule embodying the approach to be taken by 
courts (and other arbiters) towards contract interpretation. Traditionally, British courts began 
by looking at the “natural meaning” of the words used in the contract,10 such natural meaning 
being (in the words of Lord Mustill in Charter Reinsurance v Fagan)11 “their primary 
meaning in ordinary speech”.12 Contracts may, of course, deal with technical matters, often in 
highly specialised contexts, so that the meaning to be given to a specific word or phrase may 
in the context have to give way to one which is not its primary meaning in ordinary speech. 
This indeed was the conclusion of the House of Lords in Charter Reinsurance, where the 
context of the words used – a specialised form of reinsurance – pointed to a meaning other 
than the primary meaning of the words in ordinary speech. The “natural meaning” approach 
emphasises the objective meaning of words over the parties’ subjective, and perhaps entirely 
private, understanding of the words used. This traditional approach is also – contrary to some 
popular belief – a contextual approach to interpreting language: as a glance through any good 
                                                 
9
 Scottish Law Commission, Report on Interpretation in Private Law (Scot Law Com No 160, 1997).  
10
 It should be emphasised that the “natural meaning” of a word or phrase will not always be its “literal 
meaning”, although the ideas of the natural and literal meaning have sometimes been conflated by those 
commenting on contractual interpretation. Thus, the phrase “it’s raining cats and dogs” has a literal meaning 
which is evidently not the primary meaning of the phrase in ordinary speech (that primary meaning signifying 
that it is raining heavily). This point is worth stressing, as sometimes it is stated that the usual rule of contractual 
interpretation is the literal rule when what is more properly meant is the “natural” or “ordinary” rule of 
interpretation. 
11
 [1997] AC 313. 
12
 [1997] AC 313 at 384. 
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dictionary will show, most words have a number of meanings objectively ascribed to them, 
the difference in such meanings depending upon the context in which the words are used.  
 Beginning in 1997, Lord Hoffmann pioneered a new approach to interpretation, one 
which places much greater stress upon the subjective meaning ascribed by parties to the 
words used by them. Lord Hoffmann had hinted at his dissatisfaction with the traditional 
approach when he doubted the coherence of a “natural meaning” view of language in Charter 
Reinsurance.13 His full view was made plain in his important speech in Investors’ 
Compensation Scheme v West Bromwich Building Society.14 While some of what he said did 
no more than repeat elements of the traditional approach, in saying that, in every question of 
contract interpretation, the crucial question to be answered was the meaning “the document 
would convey to a reasonable person having all the background knowledge which would 
reasonably have been available to the parties in the situation in which they were in at the time 
of the contract”, he shifted the emphasis of the interpretative investigation towards the 
subjective intention of the parties. Although he made use of the idea of the “reasonable 
person” in the parties’ shoes (a nod to the idea of “subjective objectivity” discussed earlier), 
by including “all the background knowledge” of the parties the subjective element of this 
apparently objective exercise is allowed to dominate to an extent that may lead a court wholly 
back to the subjective intention of the parties in certain cases.  
 As for model law published since 1997, the DCFR adopts something of a Hoffmann 
line: article II.-8:101 states that “[a] contract is to be interpreted according to the common 
intention of the parties even if this differs from the literal meaning of the words”.15 This 
contrasts with the Law Commission’s previous approach in the RIPL, where the suggestion 
was made that the fundamental rule should be that “[a]ny expression which forms part of a 
juridical act shall have the meaning which would reasonably be given to it in its context”.16 
This is much more redolent of an objective approach to interpretation, there being no mention 
of the common intention of the parties. In the new Discussion Paper, however, the 
Commission states that it is no longer content with its former approach. It suggests amending 
that former approach to include reference to the “common intention” of the parties, without 
                                                 
13
 [1997] AC 313 at 391.  
14
 [1998] 1 WLR 896.  
15
 Note that the intention of the parties is contrasted with the literal meaning of the words, rather than the natural 
meaning: see n 10 above, on why suggestions that courts were traditionally bound slavishly to the literal 
meaning is incorrect. In suggesting that the literal meaning is the counterfoil to the common intention of the 
parties, the DCFR somewhat caricatures the traditional approach, at least so far as it has operated in Scotland 
and England.  
16
 Para 1(1) of the Schedule to the draft Bill proposed in the RIPL. 
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however going quite as far as Lord Hoffmann towards subjectivity. In so doing the 
Commission appears to be attempting to marry the twin concerns of subjectivity and 
objectivity in a compromise policy:17 
 
<EXT>the fundamental aim of contract law in general, and of the law of interpretation in 
particular, is to give effect to the common intention of the parties, as suggested in the 
DCFR, but … the basically objective approach of current Scots law and RIPL in 
determining that common intention is to be preferred to any more subjective one, and 
should be the basis for any reform proposals.<EXT> 
 
Though the Discussion Paper does not provide the specific wording of any legislative 
provision which might embody such a compromise policy, it seems that the Scottish Law 
Commission envisage that such a provision might look something like the following:18  
 
<EXT>The meaning of an expression in any contract is that which would reasonably be given 
to it in its context, taking account of  
 
(a) the parties’ common intention,  
(b) the surrounding circumstances, and  
(c) the nature and purpose of the agreement, 
  
each of which shall be determined objectively.<EXT> 
 
The idea that the reasonable meaning to be ascribed to a word in its context (traditionally, in 
written contracts, confined to the express words used by the parties in the contractual 
documents)19 is to be determined with regard to the “common intention of the parties”, as 
well as the other two matters referred to, gives rise to an interesting question of just how far 
the common intention of the parties, not disclosed in the express words of the contract itself, 
might justify meanings which bear no relation to the natural (or indeed specialist) meaning of 
the words used in the linguistic context of the relevant documents. Would the Commission’s 
                                                 
17
 Para 6.28. 
18
 The suggested wording given does not appear in the Discussion Paper, but is made here on the basis of the 
statement in the paper that “[w]e would favour a formulation along the broad lines of paragraph 1(1) of the 
Schedule to the draft Bill annexed to RIPL,
 
but including a reference to the common intention of the parties, 
objectively ascertained” (para 7.6) as well as Question 4 posed in the paper (see para 7.9). 
19
 Though, since the implementation of section 1 of the Contract (Scotland) Act 1997, no longer confined to the 
document(s) apparently comprising the contract. 
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suggested approach require a court to enforce an entirely private meaning given by the parties 
to a contract word or phrase, even one which might seem absurd to a reasonable objective 
observer?20 Would, for instance, A and B, writing “hectare” in their contract but, through 
their shared misunderstanding as to the meaning of the word hectare, in reality intending 
“acre”, be entitled to a judicial determination that the wording in the contract should mean 
“acre”?21 The answer seems not entirely clear from the Discussion Paper, but, if it is in the 
affirmative, then while such a result might agree with decisions permitting the use by parties 
of a “private dictionary”,22 such an approach could rightly be described as paying only lip 
service to the idea of objectivity. Hard cases such as this demonstrate the difficulty of trying 
to marry objectivity and subjectivity in some compromise which appears to give preference 
to neither.  
Though the proposed approach in the Discussion Paper could easily deal with cases (of 
which there are many instances) where no common intention of the parties is discernible23 – 
in such a case, the factor of common intention would simply be omitted from the 
interpretative exercise – in hard cases common intention may be pitted against objective 
appearance. It is suggested that, to deal with such hard cases, any legislation addressing a 
fundamental default rule for interpretation must disclose a preference. Both the DCFR and 
RIPL suggest a (different) preference: there will doubtless be differing views as to which is 
preferable. However, a compromise of the type which appears, on this reader’s 
understanding, to have been suggested by the Commission will not produce a clear cut 
answer in difficult cases.  
The Commission’s view may be that, because the context must “take account” of the 
parties’ intentions, this inevitably subjugates the language apparently used to the subjective 
intention of the parties, but if that is the case it would surely be better to state explicitly (as 
                                                 
20
 McBryde has argued strongly, by reference to authority, that objectively absurd meanings will not be 
supported by the courts: McBryde, Contract (n 1) paras 8.13-8.16. 
21
 Yes, if the parties’ common intention is to trump other factors; however, an absurd meaning is one which it 
would be hard to justify as being “reasonably given”, as the Commission’s proposed test requires. The parties in 
this example would certainly be entitled to have the contract rectified under section 6 of the Law Reform 
(Miscellaneous Provisions) (Scotland) Act 1985, but to reach the same practical result using interpretative 
means seems to render the statutory remedy of rectification obsolete in such a case. 
22
 Discussed by Lord Hoffmann at para 45 of his speech in Chartbrook v Persimmon [2009] UKHL 38, [2009] 1 
AC 1101. Modern judicial discussion of the ‘private dictionary’ principle derives from Partenreederei MS Karen 
Oltmann v Scarsdale Shipping Co Ltd (The Karen Oltmann) [1976] 2 Lloyd's Rep 708, though elements of the 
idea may be traced back to the nineteenth century (see especially Shore v Wilson, Lady Hewley’s Charities 
(1842) 9 Cl & F 355).  
23
 Either because the parties held private views about a matter which are at odds, or because they did not turn 
their minds to the issue when the contracts terms were concluded. Among recent cases where there appears to 
have been no common intention of the parties as to the matter in question are the Investors’ Compensation 
Society and Chartbrook decisions. 
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the DCFR does) a preference for common intention, at least where such a common intention 
exists. 
 
(2) The question of the breadth of the context or conduct which can be referred to in the 
interpretative exercise 
This second question is intimately related to the fundamental rule just discussed. A 
preference for a wide context (or “matrix of fact”, as it is often referred to) which can be 
considered in interpretative examinations will tend towards a subjective, party-intention 
approach to interpretation; a narrower context, consisting in many cases of the document(s) 
alone, will tend to an objective approach. Lord Hoffmann’s suggestion that “absolutely 
anything”24 might be considered in all cases (a suggestion later modified, in the face of 
criticism, to “anything which a reasonable man would regard as relevant”)25 creates a strong 
bias towards subjectivity. Curiously, however, Lord Hoffmann did not include within his 
“absolutely anything of relevance” approach either the pre-contractual negotiations of the 
parties or their conduct after the conclusion of the contract. Excluding these two matters has 
been a traditional peculiarity of British law: civilian systems, and even other Common law 
jurisdictions, allow recourse to such material, as the Discussion Paper narrates.26 
It is something of a puzzle why Lord Hoffmann, keen to promote as much of a focus on 
the parties’ common intention as possible, did not extend his revolutionary approach to 
revisiting the view that such pre- and post-contractual conduct cannot be considered by a 
court when assessing such intention. The typical justification for excluding pre-contractual 
conduct, that parties’ intentions may be modified between the time of their pre-contractual 
negotiations and that of contracting, is surely a matter of fact upon which courts can make a 
determination, as is the question of whether post-contractual conduct sheds any light on the 
common intention of the parties as to the meaning of the conduct. The SLC recommend 
allowing recourse to such conduct.27 Given their suggestion that the common intention of the 
parties should feature in the fundamental rule of interpretation, this seems entirely logical. 
They also suggest that unilateral declarations of intent as to the meaning of contract terms 
                                                 
24
 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 913A. 
25
 BCCI v Ali [2001] UKHL 8, [2002] 1 AC 251 at para 39 per Lord Hoffmann. 
26
 “[I]n other parts of the common law world reference to such material has either long been permissible as part 
of a generally contextual approach to interpretation (the USA) or is in the process of becoming so (New 
Zealand, Canada).”: Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (n 2) para 4.25. 
27
 Paras 6.19-6.23. 
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should be excluded from consideration,28 which is again consistent with a stress upon the 
common intention of the parties.  
 
(3) Whether consideration of anything beyond the words of the contract alone is only 
permissible in cases of “ambiguity” 
Expressions of Scottish judicial views on this question since 1997 have tended to be against 
the Hoffmann position (Lord Hoffmann having strongly espoused the view that ambiguity is 
not required).29 In Forbo-Nairn v Murrayfield,30 Lord Carloway expressed the opinion that the 
traditional canons of interpretation (such as the contra proferentem and ejusdem generis 
rules) should only be brought into play once an ambiguity has been identified;31 in Multi-Link 
Leisure Ltd v North Lanarkshire Council,32 Lord Hope took a similar view when he 
commented that an interpretative exercise which essentially “re-words” the contract should 
not occur “until it has become clear that the language the parties actually used creates an 
ambiguity which cannot be solved otherwise”.33 
The Scottish Law Commission disapprove of this view, arguing that the idea of ambiguity 
is itself ambiguous, and that the genuine issue – uncertainty of meaning, rather than technical 
ambiguity – may not become obvious until surrounding circumstances are considered.34 This 
seems a fair point, but also essentially a derivative one: if point (2) above is settled in favour 
of considering a wide context beyond the mere terms of the contract, it seems logical not to 
insist on a formalistic ambiguity requirement. That said, courts must always guard against the 
danger of meddling in contracts in which there is neither technical ambiguity nor uncertainty 
of meaning merely because they think the contract does not reflect a sensible arrangement: 
the impropriety of so doing is argued for below in relation to the ongoing litigation in 
Aberdeen City Council v Stuart Milne Group.35 
 
(4) The position of third parties 
This issue brings us back to the question of whether contracts are properly to be seen as 
entirely private affairs or whether they have a wider, public aspect to them. Any such “public 
                                                 
28
 Para 7.10. 
29
 Though for an instance of agreement with the Hoffmann view, see Lord Phillip’s comments in City Wall 
Properties (Scotland) Ltd v Pearl Assurance plc (No. 2) [2007] CSIH 79 at para 24. 
30
 [2009] CSIH 94. 
31
 Para 12.  
32
 [2010] UKSC 47. 
33
 Para 11. 
34
 Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (n 2) para 7.8. 
35
 [2009] CSOH 80; [2010] CSIH 81. 
University of Edinburgh School of Law Working Paper No 2011/36 
 
Page 11 of 16 
aspect” could be said to encompass both persons apart from the original contracting parties 
who may derive rights under the contract, as well as persons who may be required to act upon 
or enforce the contract. As to the former, Scots law has always been more disposed towards 
the rights of third parties than has English law, given its less strict view of privity and its 
consequent historic willingness to allow the fairly free assignation of contracts and the 
creation of directly enforceable third party rights. The acknowledgement of the rights of such 
third parties can creates problems for interpretation, however: a strongly subjective approach 
to interpretation, which would allow the parties to fashion the content of their contracts 
according to their own, perhaps private, intentions as to the meaning of words, runs the risk 
that third parties may be adversely affected through ignorance of such intentions.  
How is a third party – perhaps a tertius under a jus quaesitum tertio, a lender making a 
decision on whether to lend on the faith of the contract, or a cautioner advancing sums based 
upon its reasonable interpretation of the contract – to know that a private, perhaps objectively 
obscure or absurd, meaning was ascribed by the parties to a contract term? One can take a 
strict line and say that such a party simply bears any risk of such ignorance. The Discussion 
Paper takes a softer, more charitable line, however, and one which makes a concession to 
objective, non-party based interpretation in a limited class of case: where a third party 
(excluding an assignee)36 has reasonably relied upon the apparent meaning37 of a written 
contract, the proposal is that a court should not make use of extrinsic evidence to determine 
the meaning of the contract in a question with that third party.38 This would certainly protect 
the tertius, lender, or cautioner from being subjected to private meanings not evident to an 
objective observer of the contract terms, though it has the potential to create the somewhat 
complex result that the contract is taken to mean one thing for A and B but something 
different for C.  
This concession does not, however, extend to the other class of party forming part of the 
public sphere of a contract, the third party who, while deriving no right from the contract, is 
required to act upon it in some way. What, for instance, of the Keeper of the Land Register 
who is faced with a disposition (the ambit of the Discussion Paper extends not just to the 
                                                 
36
 The rationale for the proposed exclusion of an assignee is that such a party stands in the shoes of its assignor, 
and so must be treated as if the original contracting party. 
37
 The notion of “apparent meaning” is not spelt out in the Discussion Paper, but it may perhaps reasonably be 
assumed that it suggests the “ordinary meaning” of the words or phrase in question.  
38
 Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (n 2) paras 7.30-7.35 (the Commission sought views on 
whether assignees should also benefit from such a rule). 
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interpretation of contracts but to unilateral juridical acts also)39 which purports not just to 
convey the ownership of land but also to grant certain rights of access, but somewhat vaguely 
described rights not specifically described as servitudes: could the Keeper refuse to list any 
servitudes on the title sheet for the subjects, even if the parties resolutely maintain that what 
they intended in the description of the rights in question was to create such servitudes? The 
Discussion Paper does not propose any special treatment for a party such as the Keeper of a 
public register similar to that applying in the case of a tertius, lender or cautioner, as such a 
party does not in any sense “rely” upon the ex facie meaning of the document in question. 
The result is that such a party (who is, in effect, treated as any other “interpreter” of the 
contact, such as a court) would seem to be governed by the proposed basic rule of 
interpretation, which, as discussed earlier, requires account to be taken of a wide context 
including the subjective intention of the relevant parties (or party). 
 
(5) The use of maxims or rules of interpretation 
The utility of traditional rules or maxims was dismissed by Lord Hoffmann in the Investors’ 
Compensation Scheme case when he said (in distinctly precipitous fashion) that “almost all 
the old intellectual baggage of ‘legal’ interpretation has been discarded”.40 This was 
consistent with his Lordship’s view that interpreting contracts boils down to an examination 
of what, in fact, the parties actually meant by the words they used. RIPL did not propose 
specifically enacting any of these rules or maxims; some of them are however comprised in 
the provisions of the DCFR.41 No concluded view on this issue was taken in the Discussion 
Paper (though it was noted that the Economic Impact Group on the DCFR took the view that 
the rules are both favoured by commercial parties and reduce transaction costs),42 the 
Commission seeking the opinion of interested parties. Incorporating such rules, perhaps as 
last resorts to be adopted in some cases, clearly makes most sense on the basis of a 
predominantly objective approach to contractual interpretation (the rules purporting to 
embody objective features of language); on a subjective approach however, the rules have no 
obvious connection to the common intention of the parties and ought probably to be omitted, 
though they might still conceivably be used as solutions of last resort where no other obvious 
solution is evident. Given the apparent compromise embodied in the Commission’s 
                                                 
39
 “The general rule of interpretation (that any statement is to be given the meaning reasonably to be given to it 
in its context having regard to the surrounding circumstances and the nature and purpose of the juridical act) 
should be applied mutatis mutandis to unilateral juridical acts.” (para 7.41) 
40
 [1998] 1 WLR 896 at 912G. 
41
 DCFR arts. II.-8:103-107. 
42
 Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (n 2) para 7.38.  
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fundamental rule of interpretation, it is somewhat difficult to determine an obviously correct 
answer to the question posed by the Commission as to whether to include such rules or not. 
 
(6) The permissibility and function of so-called “entire contract clauses” 
The Discussion Paper narrates the concerns that some parties may have at the wide “matrix of 
fact” approach promoted by Lord Hoffmann and embodied in the paper’s suggested general 
rule.43 The Commission therefore suggests that parties should, if they so elect, be able to 
exclude extrinsic evidence as to the meaning of the contract (and thus force a court to have 
regard only to the terms of the contract itself) by use of a so-called “entire agreement” clause, 
though views were sought on whether such a clause should be enforced only where it has 
been individually negotiated.44 If such a provision is to be included in any law reform, then it 
would seem sensible to suggest in that legislation a clear form of words which might be used 
for such a clause, in order to avoid interpretative uncertainty about the meaning and effect of 
such a clause itself. Moreover, if such a provision were to be given effect to, then it would 
seem imperative to provide that a court should interpret the relevant clause in a wholly 
objective fashion, without regard to any intention of the parties that cannot be gleaned from 
the text of the document itself.  
The Commission sought views on matters other than the seven listed above, including on 
the potential costs of the proposed changes (one commonly held concern has been that the 
wider factual matrix of the type suggested by Lord Hoffmann would lead to more expensive 
litigation) and whether or not any reform should consider not just interpretation but also the 
law relating to statutory rectification of contract and personal bar, both of which have 
connections to the question of interpretation. Consideration of, at least, the rules on 
rectification may be sensible if a more subjective, “wide matrix” approach is to be taken to 
interpretation: some judicial defences of such an approach in recent case law give the 
impression that the new approach to interpretation is beginning to tread heavily on the toes of 
rectification,45 leading to confusion as to which route should be adopted by the courts in any 
specific case. 
                                                 
43
 Paras 7.19-7.23. 
44
 Paras 7.28-7.29. The ability to exclude such evidence would be consistent with the approach taken in a recent 
decision of the (English) Court of Appeal that parties may, in an entire agreement clause, exclude the 
implication by a court of a contract term on the basis of business efficacy: see Axa Sun Life Services plc v 
Campbell Martin Ltd [2011] EWCA Civ 133.  
45
 See, for instance, Lord Reed’s defence of the Hoffmann approach in Credential Bath Street Ltd. v Venture 
Investment Placement Ltd [2007] CSOH 208 at para 19 ff, in which his Lordship argues that it is entirely proper 
for interpretation to “correct mistakes” in documents. If such a view – that interpretation can quite properly 
correct errors in expression – is correct, then it seems to pull the carpet from under the feet of the statutory 
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 One issue mentioned at several points in the Discussion Paper, but which does not 
form the subject of any specific question or recommendation, is the idea that courts may, or 
should, take a “commercially sensible approach” to construing contracts. That they should so 
is an oft quoted mantra of the Scottish approach to interpretation.46 Despite its judicial 
popularity, this idea is not without its problems. Judges may adopt a different view of 
commercial sense to that taken by the parties themselves, a danger which has been judicially 
remarked upon.47 Moreover, the idea of commercial sense appears to have been pled in aid 
both of a natural/ordinary approach to interpretation as well as a more subjective, party 
orientated approach, giving rise to the suspicion that the idea of commercial sense is merely 
being used to justify the decision which a court wishes to reach.48 
More fundamentally, it may be asked why, if a party has been feckless in allowing a 
clause susceptible of a commercially disadvantageous sense to form part of the contract, it 
should be protected from the ill effects of this through a court giving the clause a 
commercially sensible interpretation rather than allowing that party simply to suffer the 
results of its commercial fecklessness. While, if both parties to a contract have acted in a 
commercially sensible way, it may not distort the contractual interpretation process to adopt a 
commercially sensible approach, if one of them has acted in a less than sensible commercial 
fashion, the superimposition of a commercially sensible approach to interpretation may result 
in providing that party with unwarranted assistance. A good demonstration of such 
unwarranted assistance may be seen in the decision of both Outer and Inner Houses in 
Aberdeen City Council v Stuart Milne Group,49 where the view was taken that a sum of 
money to be paid by a buyer of heritable property to the seller in the event of an onward sale 
should be calculated by reference to the “open market price” of the onward sale rather than 
                                                                                                                                                       
remedy of rectification. His Lordship seeks to explain (at para 22 of his judgment) how, when interpretation is 
used to add words to a contract, this is distinct from rectification, but his explanation is not entirely convincing.  
46
 The Discussion Paper states: “on the whole the Scottish courts have confined themselves to what is usually 
called a commercial or purposive approach to interpretation, seeking to give effect to the actual words used in 
the light of the circumstances surrounding the parties at the time they entered their contract” (para 5.1). Lord 
Drummond Young recently commented that “[i]n recent years the importance of construing contractual 
provisions in context, and in such a way as to give effect to the parties' commercial objectives, has been 
emphasized in a large number of cases; the principal authorities are well known and scarcely require 
discussion”: Aberdeen City Council v Stewart Milne Group Ltd [2010] CSIH 81 at para 11. 
47
 See the comments of Lord Reed in Credential Bath Street Ltd v Venture Investment Placement Ltd [2007] 
CSOH 208 at para 24 that a judge should guard “against excessive confidence that [his] view as to what might 
be commercially sensible necessarily coincides with the views of those actually involved in commercial 
contracts”. 
48
 One may note, in this respect, the cautionary words of Lord Hoffmann in the Chartbrook case at para 15: “It 
is, I am afraid, not unusual that an interpretation which does not strike one person as sufficiently irrational to 
justify a conclusion that there has been a linguistic mistake will seem commercially absurd to another.” 
49
 [2009] CSOH 80; [2010] CSIH 81. The case has been appealed to the Supreme Court, where it is hoped that 
the Council’s position will be rejected. 
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just the “gross sale proceeds” (as the express wording of the contract stipulated). The Inner 
House stressed that to calculate the sum by reference to an inter-company sale, at well below 
market price, did “not make commercial sense”.50 
That may well be so. But why should commercial good sense be attributed to a party 
which has not shown it in the drafting to which it has consented? If Aberdeen City Council 
had wanted to ensure that the open market price was used to calculate its profit share, it could 
have provided for this in the contract, but it did not. Both Outer and Inner House judgments 
have effectively altered the contract agreed by the parties to give the Council a better deal 
than the one they negotiated. Such an approach goes well beyond interpreting a contract; it 
rather makes a new contract for the parties.51 All of these considerations suggest that use of 
the idea of the “commercially sensible approach” in a meaningful and helpful way in any 
development of the law must be viewed with a great deal of caution, despite its frequent 
appearance in judgments. This may well explain why the Discussion Paper has not built the 
idea in to any of its proposals or suggestions for law reform. Going further, there may well be 
sense in specifically excluding judicial use of the idea in the interpretative process, given its 
tendency to encourage judges to stray into contract making rather than contract interpretation. 
 
 
D. THE WAY FORWARD FOR LAW REFORM 
 
The Law Commission suggests that something must be done about interpretation (doing 
nothing is said not to be an option), and that what must be done ought, given the 
developments of the last fifteen years, to go beyond what was originally proposed in the 
RIPL.52 This suggestion is well made. There is currently such a diversity of opinion among 
the Scottish (and English) bench on the subject of interpretation that an agreed approach is 
unlikely to emerge through the developing case law. Some may worry that the creation of a 
distinctively Scottish approach, different to that adopted in the English courts, may create 
confusion and lead contracting parties to abandon Scottish law as the lex contractus in favour 
of its southern cousin. While joint English and Scottish Commission action on the matter 
might have been preferable (indeed, ideally the drafting of a complete Civil Code would be 
preferable to piecemeal development of the law), there is no doubt that a distinctively 
                                                 
50
 [2010] CSIH 81 at para 10 per Lord Drummond Young.  
51
 If the document signed by the parties was though genuinely not to reflect their underlying agreement, then 
rectification of the document should have been sought. 
52
 Discussion Paper on Interpretation of Contract (n 2) paras 7.1-7.3. 
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Scottish approach in other areas of contract law is a positive thing: no one, for instance, 
suggests that we should be concerned at the lack of a requirement of consideration in Scots 
law. One might also suggest that the certainty which a clear statutory approach would offer 
would be preferable to the current shifting position, where the outcome to litigation can often 
depend upon whether the judge determining the case favours a pro- or anti-Hoffmann 
approach. Such uncertainty of outcome cannot be good for contracting parties. 
While many of the proposals in the Discussion Paper discussed above have merit to 
them, it has been suggested that the fundamental tension between objective and subjective 
approaches to the words parties use in their contracts cannot be dodged in the tentative 
compromise suggested by the Commission concerning the core or fundamental rule of 
interpretation; preference must be given to one over the other, the correct response to related 
practical issues emerging as a consequence of this choice. Some may argue that, as a prelude 
to possible European harmonisation of contract law, Scotland should fall in to line with the 
DCFR rule that preference is to be given to the common intention of the parties (considered 
in a wide factual context) rather than the objective meaning of the words used by them 
(considered in a narrower context). However, not only is the final position that may be 
adopted in any possible harmonised European law far from certain, but it has been suggested 
that a preference for the common intention of parties raises the spectre, in difficult cases, of 
leading courts back to an impractical emphasis upon subjective party intentions. It would be 
consistent with the historic trend of Scots law away from a naïve focus on subjective 
intention towards objective assessment of parties’ conduct (save in exceptional cases53) for a 
primarily objective approach to be taken towards the interpretation of contracts. Such an 
approach recognises the public as well as private aspect of contracts, is consistent with the 
use of the shared medium which is human language, and would minimise the temptation 
which some courts have unfortunately shown to seek to improve upon the bargains reached 
by the parties in the name of commercial good sense.  
 
                                                 
53
 Subjective intention is, for instance, looked at in cases where an error in transaction is pled by a contracting 
party.  
